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The main feature of the draft Constitution is its closeness to the current
institutional set-up of politics in Rwanda. As we all know, this is deeply beneficial to
the perceived interests of the powers-that-be: it all but guarantees the continued
exercise of power by the FPR. This reflects the fact that in Rwanda, power is
exclusively in the hands of the FPR, which faces no solid political, military, or
intellectual challenges. 
The only potential counter-power in Rwanda is currently in the hands of the
international community. But counter-power only influences policy outcomes if it is
exercised to that effect, which means that those who potentially possess it actualize it
through explicit, unified, and sustained political involvement (involvement is more
than only pressure; it also entails support and dialogue) Disjointed pressures for
some changes in the text of the Constitution does not amount to the exercise of
counter-power.
The provisions of the draft Constitution, combined with the extremely short
time available for political mobilization, the suppression of most forms and sources of
organized political dissent, and the control of the key institutions of judiciary and
administrative oversight by the FPR –all guarantee a continuation of the current
regime in power. What will happen later this year, then, will be an elaborate fake, but
not a truly democratic event. Where does this all leave the international community?  
The international community needs an approach that is neither totally
condemnatory nor totally accepting. It must build on the dynamics and possibilities
that exist in Rwanda, no matter how small and slow they are; work respectfully with
the government, taking it on its word and moving on from there in a negotiated
manner; be willing to work in a political way, with clear and explicit understandings of
the political nature of the stakes and a concomitant willingness to use its counter-
power; and engage for the long run and with sufficient resources, for there are no
quick-fix solutions to the sort of problems Rwandans face. 
The paper proposes a multi-pronged strategy: 
1. Donors should rapidly, systematically, and in a concerted fashion use the
existing margin to push for a small set of key changes in the most dangerous
and inflexible provisions in the draft Constitution. These include the limitations
on freedom of speech and political party formation (especially art. 25 & 56).
The aim should not be to remove all limitations on free speech or party
formation –that will not happen, nor would that necessarily be a good thing—
but to make such limitations as are required of a more limited and exceptional
nature, respectful of constitutional supremacy, and capable of control by the
Supreme Court. The Political Parties Forum is another clause that seems
designed solely to maintain the FPR’s capacity to emaciate the other parties. It
may not be negotiable, however.
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2. The international community should then provide minimal support to the
elections, incl. monitoring them honestly, and refraining from the usual (self)-
congratulations on how marvelously good governance has proceeded in
Rwanda, and how great the support we gave to it has been. The job of
promoting democracy in Rwanda begins with the elections –it does not end
there. 
3. During the next 5 years, the international community should assist the GoR
with the development and implementation of a coherent program of increased
opening up and negotiation with much of the internal and external opposition,
with the aim of slowly creating some real political opening in Rwanda. Take the
GoR on its word: it has an excellent discourse about participation and
democracy and good governance, and has begun creating small openings at
home and abroad. None of this will come about rapidly or easily, but principled
and critical support to move forwards is possible.  
4. In parallel, the international community should continue investing in some of
the key structural bases required for any move towards a more democratic
Rwanda. Foremost, this includes decentralization with a citizenship approach
(see Unsworth & Uvin Oct. 2002); mechanisms for information, learning and




2. The Constitutional Commission has put hard work and good thinking in the
draft Constitution. Clear language on human rights, the separation of powers,
judiciary independence, secret vote, presidential term limits, etc. are all highly
positive. Significant fear, however, exists regarding key provisions limiting freedom of
speech, political party formation and behavior, etc. In addition, major legal
weaknesses also remain in the draft Constitution: at times, power is granted to the
Parliament to essentially modify the Constitution by simple law, while at other times
the Draft goes into the sort of detail that only laws should do. Other comments by
constitutional legal scholars have already pointed out in detail some such issues.
There seems to exist a willingness on the part of the Constitutional Commission to
improve the legal quality of the Constitution –albeit under a too tight deadline and
within tight political constraints. Donors should rapidly, systematically, and in a
concerted fashion use the existing margin to push for a small set of key changes that
have the highest political pay-off, i.e., rather than pushing for changes in tens of
points required to make this a “perfect” constitution (quite a debatable matter in any
case), they should select a few changes that are crucial in terms of providing
openings and undoing opportunities for abuse.  
2. The main feature of the draft Constitution is its closeness to the current
institutional set-up of the political game in Rwanda. The draft Constitution is thus
rightly seen as deeply beneficial to the continued exercise of power by the FPR.
While acknowledging that the Constitutional Commission has worked hard to consult
a large number of Rwandans as well as to learn from tens of other Constitutions
worldwide, and while acknowledging as well that many clauses in the draft
Constitution can be intellectually defended –as could have been totally different if not
opposite ones—it is clear that the content of the draft Constitution is deeply beneficial
to the perceived interests of the powers-that-be. This is nothing but expectable:
everywhere, major policy decisions are made by and for those who wield political
power. In Rwanda, that power is exclusively in the hands of a small group of people
inside the FPR: their control over Rwanda is currently totally unchecked, and they
face no solid political, military, or intellectual challenges. The draft Constitution
reflects this reality, and it could hardly be expected not to. 
3. As a matter of fact, the only potential counter-power inside Rwanda is currently
in the hands of the international community. The survival of the regime (not so much
its physical or military survival as its capacity to provide a semblance of normality, a
functioning state, a modicum of basic social services, in urban and rural areas, and
decent salaries) depends on the international community’s continued support. Until
now, this counter-power has been mostly theoretical. After all, counter-power only
influences policy outcomes if it is exercised to that effect, which means that those
who potentially possess it actualize it through explicit, unified, and sustained political
involvement (involvement, by the way, is more than only pressure; it also entails
support and dialogue). This has hardly ever happened in the last decade, however,
as a result of various factors: guilt over the cowardice of the international community
before and during the genocide; the political timidity that usually accompanies
sovereignty; divergent assessments of trends in Rwanda between donors; and
bureaucratic inertia (it is really difficult to create and implement a sustained vision,
and much easier to limit oneself to small, discrete projects and occasional ad-hoc
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demarches). In short, for practical, ethical, and ideological reasons, the international
community has not until now acted as a counter-power. If, however, some of these
obstacles can be surmounted, impact can be had (see the pressure for Rwandan
withdrawal from the DRC). The international community can and should exercise its
counter-power in this process of adoption and implementation of a new Constitution,
while seeking to minimize its interventionism and reinforcement of outwards
accountability. This paper outlines some paths to that effect. 
3. As things stand, the provisions of the draft Constitution, combined with the
extremely short time available for electoral mobilization, the suppression of most
forms of organized political dissent, and the control of the key institutions of judiciary
and administrative oversight by the FPR –all these factors together guarantee a
continuation of the current regime in power. What will happen later this year, then, will
look like, but not remotely be, a democratic event. All Rwandans, and most
foreigners, are fully aware of this. Small modifications in the language of the
Constitution will not change this outcome –although they may still be important in the
longer run.  
4. In the first section of this report, I will start from the current text of the draft
Constitution and reflect on how donors can support a process of meaningful
democratization starting from this text. In a second section, I will start not from the
actual text of the Constitution, bur rather from the question “what factors are likely to
create violent conflict in Rwanda?” and then proceed with the next local step: “how
does the draft Constitution affect these factors?” Given space constraints, I will write
the rest of this paper in the form of bullet points. 
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PART 1. FROM THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO DEMOCRACY
5. Quite a few provisions of the draft Constitution are most positive from the
perspective of both democratization and the prevention of violent conflict. To mention
but some: 
a. Posts in government must be distributed proportional to the
Parliamentary distribution; the largest party can only have 50% of these
positions (40% in previous drafts!); the Prime Minister and Speaker of
the House cannot be of the same party as the President; the
Presidential veto can be overruled with a 60% majority 
b. structural constraints on the power of the main party, potentially forcing
it into cross-party alliances and compromises –a priori not a bad idea in
a country like Rwanda.  
6. Multiple and strong mentions of human rights, equality and non-discrimination 
Direct election of the President and most members of the House by secret ballot;
term limits; the creation of the office of ombudsman; strong protection for the
independence of the judiciary (and significant powers accorded to the judiciary), etc.
potential counter-mechanisms to dictatorship
Some provisions, though, are deeply dangerous as well. Most discussed are: 
a. Limitations on freedom of speech, press, and association enshrined in
the draft Constitution (especially art. 25) –and in the already existing
law—provide enormous opportunities for abuse. There may be a margin
for maneuver here for donors to insist on language that decreases the
potential for abuse. The best solution may be to explicitly use the
language of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
which does allow for limitations on the right to free speech either to
protect the rights of others, or for purposes of national security, public
order, etc. (art 3, also art. 20). Such restrictions are deviations from the
norm, governed by clear rules, and subject to legal interpretation and
jurisprudence. It may be possible to convince the Constitutional
Commission of the necessity for these changes in language, not to
remove all limitations on free speech –that will not happen, nor would
that necessarily be a good thing— but to make such limitations as are
required of a more limited and exceptional nature, respectful of
constitutional supremacy, and capable of interpretation by the Supreme
Court. 
b. Limitations on the functioning of political parties (art 56 for example).
Some changes may well be underway here: the “suspension” clause
may be significantly modified; the powers of the Forum have been
reduced (“assurer la discipline” has been dropped). That said, the
Political Party Forum does continue to exist and has served until now
clearly a function of muzzling opposition and dissent; the limitations on
local party organization also continue (art 56 foremost). Again, to the
extent that the intent of these provisions is to prevent exclusion and
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discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, they ought not be entirely
removed –nor could they, for the Rwandans really consider them
crucial. Rather, respectful but firm discussions could be held to ensure
that the language is made clearer and more restrictive, for example by
simply forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, region,
or gender (art 78). 
7. The selection of members of the House (24 women appointed by the towns
and districts) and the Senate (appointed by various organs). As good as all of these
organs are currently dominated by the FPR. In addition, the Senate is given truly
extensive powers, which can be increased by law. All of the above benefits the FPR,
granting it a significant capacity to co-opt or oppress all political opposition. 
8. As observed by the ICG in its Nov. 2002 report, the whole set-up is part and
parcel of the FPR’s ideology of “consensual democracy”. This approach is based on
deep distrust of the Rwandan population, the prominence of a military/security logic,
the fact that the FPR is without contest in control of power, as well as the conviction
that outsiders cannot be relied upon to protect them (the latter conviction is entirely
correct, and greatly limits the credibility of international attempts to push the FPR to
put itself at risk, which is what, at the end of the day, many of the proposed changes
amount to).
9. The problem is that this position, while not without intellectual and political
basis, contains clear dangers. The heavy-handed and restrictive policies it results in
may (are likely to) have the following negative consequences:
10. continued if not increased human rights violations are its automatic corollary,
justified in the name of the greater good (stability, peace, social and mental
transformation,…). this may create further violent conflict potential both inside and
outside Rwanda a gradual retrenchment of the size and representativeness of the
group in power is likely with such militaristic, socially isolated, and potentially
uncontested power (this is already occurring or not?). as the saying goes, absolute
power corrupts absolutely: abuses of power in all realms of life may increase (this
again is not automatic, but likely, and may already be occurring)
11. While all this is correct and important, two points more are needed in the way
of analysis.
12. First, some of the provisions of the draft Constitution –even the ones
discussed above as negative—are relatively flexible, in that they provide both
constraints and opportunities, depending on the broader political context. Appointed
senators may use the resources and the relative security of their long-term office to
ask difficult questions; coalition governments may be forced to make real
compromises and respect different points of view; the impossibility to create explicitly
ethnic parties may force opposition leaders to reach out more and develop more
sophisticated discourses, etc. This seems unlikely at present, given the dominance of
the FPR, including its capacity to use extra-legal means to impose its views, but this
does not automatically follow from the inherent nature of the legal clauses
themselves; rather, it results from the political context of closure and FPR monopoly
that characterizes the present. If and when the FPR loosens the reigns of control a
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bit; if and when the distribution of power begins to change; if and when Rwandans
begin to take some more risks and speak out for real social interests –and these are
possible trends, which the international community can support-- then these clauses
may allow such change to anchor itself. While at the moment, this may seem far
removed, one day (not tomorrow, admittedly, nor after the current elections) people
inside and outside of the circles of power will provide contestation in Rwanda, as they
do everywhere (it took 7 decades or more in Mexico and Japan for monopoly parties
to be so challenged, for example, but it did happen, and when it happened,
constitutional provisions such as these proved to be part of what made it possible). 
13. It may be thus more important for the international community, if it seeks to
use its voice to obtain changes in the Constitution, to focus only on those clauses that
are truly inflexible, even in the long run –those clauses that contain only the promise
of closure and abuse. The ones drastically limiting free speech seem to be foremost
of them. It is not necessary (nor, for that matter, possible) to entirely remove these,
but at the least, their language needs to be tightened, the exceptional nature of
constraints made clearer, criteria made narrower and clearer, and judicial overview
and appeal made as strong as possible. I believe it is possible to achieve this. The
Political Parties Forum is another clause that has no positive or opening effect
whatsoever: it seems designed solely to maintain the FPR’s capacity to emaciate the
other parties. This may be much harder to change.     
14. Second, it is not sufficient to simply point out the dangers inherent in the FPR
ideology (or the draft Constitution), and assume that the opposite policy (or
constitutional clauses) contains no dangers, or that the policy has no basis. Difficult
judgment need to be made:
15. To what extent is the FPR’s vision at least partly based on correct or
understandable assumptions? The genocidal ideology that permeated Rwandan
society and allowed for mass participation, has certainly not mysteriously
disappeared, for example. 
16. What does history teach us? Every time Rwanda opens up to multi-party
politics, this seems to lead to ethnic polarization and mass violence –whether just
before independence, or in the years preceding the genocide. One can debate why
this is so: is it that Rwandans are socially and culturally not ripe for democracy? That
democracy is a dangerous thing in deeply divided societies? That it is not democracy
but the resistance against it by elites that favor the status quo that causes the
violence? That the language of radical ethnicity is the most easy to use by politicians,
both those in power or those in opposition? Whatever the causes –and the scholarly
literature argues any of these positions, both for the case of Rwanda and
elsewhere—history gives us little hope for rapid dramatic changes.    
17. What are the concrete better ideas out there? It is very revealing to read in the
ICG report (Nov. 2002: p. 25) that the opposition (a “blood pact” between people
allied with the genocidal machinery in need of legitimacy and some small Tutsi-
dominated parties in need of military clout) has basically the same project of




18. Against this background, how can the international community assist in the
process of moving Rwanda towards a more democratic and peaceful state? I will
discuss four possible paths here. The first “radical change” option is upheld by many
as the ideal solution, but I will argue it is a dangerous, uncertain, and in any case
impossible one. A second scenario is my preferred one: a multi-pronged, medium-
term international engagement in Rwanda’s political development. The third scenario
is the one underlying the FPR rhetoric: it is essentially a slow, “grow out of it”
scenario --theoretically possible but very risky. The fourth one is a depoliticized,
muddle trough scenario, resembling current practice: while most likely to occur, it is
by far least desirable.   
19. Two important analyses of the draft Constitution --the ICG report and
Professor Reyntjens’ recent analysis—propose as the ideal solution to cancel the
process leading to the adoption of the Constitution as well as the holding of elections,
and to oblige the regime to organize a major political dialogue with the internal and
external opposition leading to power sharing and the adoption of a new Constitution.
While appealing in its clarity and radical breakthrough nature, this recommendation
presents a number of serious problems. The foremost one is that it simply will not
happen, for nobody wants it. The GoR would categorically refuse it and rather pay the
price of reduced aid; the donors have shown not the slightest interest in it, and
painted themselves in the corner with their rhetoric of democracy/elections in 2003;
and it seems unclear how many of the opposition groups would be willing to honestly
participate in such a dialogue as well (and which ones ought to be excluded!). Even if
somehow the international community could force most of the players into such a
process they do not want, it would take a long time and create a situation propitious
to violence and chaos, as parties jockey for a seat at the table and for the most
advantageous outcomes, while others resent their non-inclusion, and other seek to
sabotage the entire process. All of this would lead to major violence. In the meantime,
Rwanda would be almost un-governed, while, like in Burundi, the large majority of the
population would remain silenced and overlooked. Hence, this is not a good
proposition. And yet, I do realize that a political dialogue could constitute a major way
to break through the current stalemate –I just do not think it can be done right now,
forced, before anything else happens. 
The solution I advocate consists of a multi-pronged strategy: 
a. Work immediately on a few key changes in the most dangerous
provisions in the draft Constitution, along the lines of the discussion
above;
b. Let elections happen, although with minimal support. Recognize the
elections for what they are, save a buck (the civic education programs,
for example, the workshops in expensive hotels –there is quite some
slack here!), assist with monitoring them, and be honest in what they
amount to: a first incomplete attempt. Refrain from the usual (self)-
congratulations on how marvelously good governance has proceeded in
Rwanda, and how great the support we gave to it has been. Recognize
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that international community support to democratization in Rwanda is
only beginning during the coming months –not ending!
c. Assist the GoR with the development and implementation of a coherent
program of increased opening up and negotiation, with the aim of slowly
creating some real political opening in Rwanda during the next 5 years.
Take the government on its word: it talks a lot about participation and
democracy and good governance. None of these things will come about
rapidly or easily, but principled and critical support to move forwards is
possible.  After the elections will be the time to use counter-power.
20. In parallel, continue investing in some of the key structural bases for any move
towards a more democratic Rwanda: decentralization (see the paper I co-authored
with Sue Unsworth in Oct. 2002 on how aid can support a move from clients to
citizens); information and networking; and significant guarantees for the autonomy
and competency of the Supreme Court (see below). Again, take the government on
its word when it comes to the decentralization policy and judicial autonomy.
21. A much riskier solution is the same as above but without c), i.e., without the
political dialogue. This is the path the FPR seems to prefer: the slow construction of
the social, economic, and eventually political bases for democracy to emerge. There
is a chance this may work, as it did in East Asian developmental states. A
combination of sustained economic growth that leads to widespread improvements in
well-being; cooptation of fresh and competent leadership into the structures of
governance (as is already happening now –see some of the senior government
appointments late last year, as well as the process of local elections); a slowly
growing margin for debate within and with the circles of power that feel secure about
the future; an increasing margin for manoeuver at the local level as people take
initiatives for local economic development –all these factors together could create a
slow and managed  transition. The chance this incremental works is not very big, for
many of the structural factors that could underlie such a transition may be absent in
Rwanda: no independent and dynamic private sector; a history of violence, exclusion,
and distrust; extreme poverty; regional instability; a militaristic and insular
government. If the international community wants to support this process, it needs to
keep on investing in the features of the developmental state; support significant
improvements in popular well-being; and maintain constant vigilance and pressure to
keep the process on its political and economic tracks, all of this over the course of a
generation. This is not easy at all. 
22. Worst, by far --and yet most likely to happen-- is the fourth “solution,” in which,
after some disjointed pressure for changes in the draft Constitution, “elections” will be
organized under significant international community cheerleading, to be followed by
the usual gradual decline in aid, as many donors are disappointed, other crises take
over, and interest wanes. The donor community owes it to Rwanda to avoid this
outcome (note that, evidently, foremost Rwandans owe it to themselves to avoid this
outcome!). 
23. In short, the approach should be neither to totally condemn the regime and
seek to force seemingly ideal and probably unrealizable solutions onto it, nor to totally
accept the regime’s practice and stick to rhetoric, (self)-congratulation. The
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international community must build on the dynamics and possibilities that exist in
Rwanda, no matter how small and slow they are; work respectfully with the
government, at the least taking it on its word and moving on from there; be willing to
work in a political way, with clear and explicit understandings of the nature of the
stakes and a willingness to use its counter-power; and engage for the long run and
with sufficient resources, for there are no quick-fix solutions to the sort of problems
Rwandans face.  
Some Additional Remarks about the Judiciary
24. The draft Constitution accords to the judiciary –foremost the Supreme Court--
major capacities to constrain the other branches of government, by enforcing rules,
reviewing laws, resolving disputes, etc. Given the strong human rights references
contained in the draft Constitution, an independent and activist judiciary could play a
major role in limiting or undoing possible abuses, including those resulting from the
restrictive speech and association clauses in the same constitution. Vice versa, an
incompetent or non-independent judiciary could be a crucial tool for undermining any
move towards democratization. Hence, one of the keys that will determine the impact
of the Constitution on Rwandan political life will be the quality and independence of
the judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court. 
25. The recent history of Rwanda, under the current regime and, even more so,
under the previous, demonstrates that judicial independence is extremely hard to
achieve in a society characterized by extreme poverty, deep social polarization, and
violent political pressure. There is thus good reason to fear that judicial independence
will be insufficient to guarantee the outcomes designed by the draft Constitution. 
26. The problem with this argument is that every single clause of every single
Constitution real and imaginable would suffer from these real-world defects, for the
material, political, and social pressures on all actors in Rwandan society will not
disappear by a stroke of the pen, no matter how smart or well-intended the hand that
holds it. Judges are not the only ones who are corruptible, subject to fear, or
influenced by racist ideologies: so are politicians, including opposition ones, NGO
members, journalists, ordinary people, and the like. As a result, any constitution will
fail –or could be feared to fail—using these criteria. The only theoretically perfect
solution to that is to design rules of the game that are considered legitimate by such a
proportion of the population as to be upheld from within. Ultimately, the greatest
strength of institutions, and especially meta-institutions like a constitution that lay
down the rules of the game, is to be recognized and internalized by the actors whose
behavior is constrained by it.  
27. What does this mean for donors? First, that they ought to choose option two
discussed above, and invest in such a dialogue during the years to come. Nobody
can guarantee the success of this venture, but it must be attempted. In addition,
donor interest in the Constitution must not stop at the moment it is promulgated and
the elections are held, but must continue with a specific focus on the Supreme Court.
This should go beyond the usual capacity building programs, useful as they are. It
should include specific and original measures to assure the independence of the
Court, such as: the long-term provision of significant salary complements; the
creation of peer networks of discussion with and feedback by foreign judges; and a
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strong, clearly articulated, and consistently applied commitment not to tolerate any
intimidation against judges and their families. Donors need to go beyond the usual
technical approach to judicial support, useful as it may be: given the centrality of the
Court to Rwandan politics, an explicitly political yet hands-off approach by the
international community is indispensable. 
28. The nature of this approach is merely to take the GoR on its word, and create
the conditions for the Constitution, as developed by Rwandans, to function –not to
modify it. The Constitution does provide tools for governance, and it serves no
purpose to neglect this. The job of the international community is to assist this
process through critical, politically savvy, support.  
PART 2. FROM CONFLICT ANALYSIS TO THE CONSTITUTION
The likely causes of mass violence in Rwanda are (in order of probability?):
a. Aggression from outside: like under the previous regime, oppression
and cooptation work relatively well internally. The foremost risk to the
current Rwandan regime lies outside its borders, and the alliances this
armed opposition is able to force within itself, with foreign sponsors,
and, in last position, with Rwandans inside the country. This can lead to
violence inside the Rwandan territory, both as a result of the attacks
themselves and of the violent and typically indiscriminate counter-
measures (although there have been exceptions).
b. Violent divisions within the ruling clique, manifested in a coup d’Etat by
disaffected parts of the army, or in the murder of senior people, e.g. the
President of the Republic. Divisions within the army, with some
remaining loyal and others rebelling.  
c. Extreme frustration and anger inside Rwanda: continued mass
impoverishment, land reform that deprives large numbers of people of
their land, lack of hope for a future among disaffected youth, a sense of
extreme inequality, injustice and social exclusion –in short, a sense that
the game is so stacked against them, and the rules so unjust, that the
future will only be worse than the present, and that only radical change
is possible. This can involve both Hutu and Tutsi –it is not an ethnic
thing. This is not likely to happen on a massive scale. 
29. Unbridled electoral competition, in which in an “all goes” atmosphere the
ethnic card is played, old and new recriminations are radicalized, camps pitted
against each other, insults, lies and insinuations come to dominate the political game.
Local political entrepreneurs use violence, remind people of old violence, talk about
the need for preventive violence at both sides, etc. Admittedly, the situation is
different now from 1994. Contrary to then, the repressive machinery of the state will
not carry out genocide: it has neither such ideology nor the means to achieve that
end. So it would be less centralized, less fast, than before –a more spontaneous
combustion, a slow but unstoppable spread of the wildfire of divisionism and violence
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on the dry bush of past memories. This option is not likely to occur, however, as there
is no such political opening. 
30. The continued existence of an ideology of ethnic hatred and exclusionary
racism. In and by itself, this will not lead to mass violence: the genocidal ideology is
currently not organized in Rwanda, and internal security keeps too close an eye on
everyone. But in combination with any of the above, racism – and hatred-inspired
violence could spread rapidly.  
31. Under status quo conditions, only the first two dynamics are likely to occur.
The other three constitute major risks, but they are more remote at this point. 
Apart from these five factors, there are two other less visible forms of violence that
already exist in Rwanda. They both do not threaten major political violence in the
short run –and might thus be overlooked in a debate like this —but they are not only
unjust, but also in the long run potentially threats to stability as well.  
32. One is the continued violence of human rights abuses. While the situation is
not close to the one prevailing in many other countries (incl. neighboring Burundi, or,
to take a few countries in the news these days, North Korea or Iraq), and while the
stability that prevails in current Rwanda is crucial (war is the greatest source of
human rights violations by far), it still remains that the current regime too frequently
employs intimidation, imprisonment, murder, etc. to achieve its aims (note that we are
talking here about what happens inside Rwanda, overlooking the stunning human
rights abuses perpetrated, with Rwandan complicity, in the DRC).
33. The other is the structural violence of the growing inequality, corruption, social
exclusion, and humiliation. It is not clear what changes have taken place here
compared to the previous regime. Some things may have become better –the quality
of exams for entry into secondary and tertiary education, for example; or the
existence of stronger institutions for control of public spending—but other variables
are clearly still weak (corruption and social exclusion, with a very small group of well-
connected people controlling many of the benefits of the system) if not worse
(inequality in all likelihood). 
34. What is the impact of the draft Constitution on these factors? By itself, rather
little, it seems. 
35. It essentially has no impact on the three first causes of mass violence outlined
in par. 22 a. It could outlaw coups d’Etat, or foreign invasions, or frustration, but that
would hardly be worth much. The draft Constitution affects these variables indirectly,
through the kind of political climate it allows to create, but, as we discussed, that is
tributary to more than the Constitution alone. 
36. On the positive side, the draft Constitution does provide significant protections
against some of the elements of structural violence described in par. 23 b: equality of
treatment, non-discrimi-nation, repeated clauses against corruption, the office of the
ombudsman, some of the features of the developmental state, etc. It also makes the
sort of political competition that characterizes the pre-genocide period (par. 22 d)
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impossible –but, as we discussed, that comes with a serious cost in terms of
freedoms and carries with it long-term risks. 
37. On the negative side, the draft Constitution does not provide significant
protection against the kind of human rights violations described in par. 23 a. Indeed, it
actually legalizes (together with laws already on the books) severe limitations on the
freedom of speech and political organization that can be used against opponents.
More broadly, to the extent that the Constitution allows (or is used by) the FPR to
continue a full and oppressive control of the entire political, economic and social
space in Rwanda, it may create the sort of frustration and anger that can that
strengthen some of the dynamics described in par. 22. 
38. In short, the immediate impact of the Constitution on the likely dynamics of
conflict seems to be rather small. Its indirect, longer term impact can be important,
but is tributary to dynamics that lie beyond the Constitution sensu strictu and reside in
the broader context of the evolution of Rwandan society. As discussed in par. 14 ff.,
the international community can play a major role in these trends, even with the
Constitution as it is (or, hopefully, improved significantly). The real challenge for the
donors as they think about the Constitution and conflict, then, lies more in what they
will do in the five years to come, starting from the Constitution, than in the short term.
Significant further smart political thinking is required. The willingness to solicit the sort
of opinions about the Constitution as discussed here is an excellent start.  
